How long are we to continue a search before we have a right to give up the search and declare not only that continuing the search is vain but also that the very object of the search is nonexistent? There are times that searches must be continued against extreme odds. There are other times when searches are best given up. Despite Poseidon’s wrath, Odysseus was right to continue seeking Ithaca. Sisyphus, on the other hand, should have given up rolling the rock up the hill long ago. We no longer look kindly on angle trisectors and circle squares. We are amused by purported perpetuum mobile devices. Alchemists do not receive funding from the National Science Founation. We deny the existence of unicorns, gnomes and fairy godmothers. In these cases we don’t just say that the search for these objects is vain; we postively deny that the objects exist. Such denials, such claims that certain searches are vain, such admissions that certain modes of discourse cannot succeed in solving certain problems are widespread, both in and out of science. Stephen Meyer refers to them as “proscriptive generalizations.”
There is no precise line of demarcation for deciding when a search is to be given up and when the object of a search is to be denied existence. Nevertheless I would offer a necessary condition. The failure in practice to discover a thing is a good reason to doubt the thing’s existence only if a diligent search for the thing has been performed. A full and efficient use of our empirical and theoretical resources for discovery should be made before we accept a proscriptive generalization.
— William Dembski, in Intelligent Design (disclaimer: according to a secondhand source.)
What is extraordinary is that this is essentially an argument for strong atheism, articulated in a book arguing for intelligent design. I wonder if Dembski’s supporters know he feels this way? Or perhaps they just don’t think to take it to its logical conclusion?
